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ONE STEP FORWARD FOR HEDGE FUND
INVESTORS: THE REMOVAL OF THE
SOLICITATION BAN AND THE CHALLENGES THAT
LIE AHEAD
Cary Martin †
The JOBS Act accomplished what many thought to be inconceivable.
After being excluded from the privilege of advertising for eight decades,
Congress has finally lifted the solicitation ban for emerging companies,
hedge funds, and various other private vehicles. With respect to the hedge
fund industry, which is the primary focus of this article, there have been
numerous discussions among commentators regarding the anticipated
effects of this law. These discussions range from measuring the extent to
which the JOBS Act will facilitate capital formation, to whether it will
undermine this goal by leading to an influx of fraudulent investment
schemes. In contrast, this Article focuses on the anticipated effects that
advertising will have on hedge fund investors, which can include wealthy
individuals, pension plans, insurance companies, banks, and various other
classes of institutions. This Article argues that advertising could actually
enhance investor protection for this subset of investors as it will likely
improve transparency, promote healthy competition, and, in some cases,
make it more difficult for fraudulent advisers to induce prospective
investors. And while the removal of the solicitation ban is generally a step
in the right direction for hedge fund investors, this Article concludes with a
brief discussion of the regulatory challenges that still remain and an
explanation of why these hurdles may be exacerbated with the removal of
the ban. Such challenges include the inherent conflicts of interest and the
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lack of standardization with respect to hedge fund valuations, the fraud
loophole created by smaller funds that escape oversight under the Advisers
Act, and the potential increase in speculation that could significantly
compromise investor confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
“Together, we discovered that a free market only thrives
when there are rules to ensure competition and fair play.” 1
President Barack Obama
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) is a
monumental piece of legislation that was enacted under the Obama
Administration on April 5, 2012. 2 Its purported purpose is “[t]o increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the
1. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address at United States Capitol (Jan. 21,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama).
2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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public capital markets for emerging growth companies.” 3 The JOBS Act
seeks to achieve these goals by relaxing many of the regulations that
previously applied to private issuers. 4 Thus, the fundamental assumption
that underscores this legislation is that looser regulations can make it easier
for private companies to raise capital, which will in turn fuel growth within
the broader economy.
One of the most prominent components of the JOBS Act is its
elimination of the solicitation ban for private companies that rely on Rule
506 of Regulation D. 5 Under this exemption, private issuers were allowed
to raise an unlimited amount of capital and offer interests to an unlimited
number of accredited investors. 6 In exchange, however, such issuers were
largely restricted from advertising to the general public so as to preserve
the private nature of these vehicles. 7 This exclusion encompassed a wide
range of both direct and indirect communications between private issuers
and prospective investors. 8 For example, a private issuer could lose its
Rule 506 exemption by communicating any aspect of its underlying
business to the press, mentioning a fund name in an interview, or
maintaining informative websites regarding its offerings or investment
strategies. 9 As a result of this broad interpretation, many issuers,
particularly smaller and emerging companies, faced significant hurdles in
entering private markets. 10 With the removal of the solicitation ban, these
companies are now permitted to engage in broad advertising activities to
actively solicit a wider range of prospective investors, which will arguably
make it easier for such issuers to access the private markets on a level
playing field with larger issuers. 11
With respect to the hedge fund industry, which is the primary focus of
this article, there have been many discussions among commentators
regarding the anticipated effects of this new law. These discussions range
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 112-106, §201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), .506 (2013).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013).
9. See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining the previous legal framework of
regulating informative solicitation).
10. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General
Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004)
(asserting “that the ban [had] a negative impact on the capital-raising efforts of emerging
companies”); Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal
Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (arguing that
“[s]mall, developing companies are severely handicapped by the non-solicitation
rulesFalse”).
11. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 4.
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from measuring the extent to which the JOBS Act will facilitate capital
formation, 12 to determining whether it will undermine this goal by leading
to an influx of fraudulent investment schemes. 13 As background, hedge
funds are privately organized investment companies that utilize a broad
array of strategies. 14 Contrary to their mutual fund counterparts, hedge
funds have more flexibility to engage in derivatives trading and maintain
higher levels of leverage. 15 They also retain several other flexibilities
related to disclosure practices, governance structures, and accounting
requirements, which are all tightly regulated processes for registered
investment companies. 16 Since hedge funds are restricted to accredited
investors, 17 such as wealthy individuals, pension plans, insurance
companies, banks, and other categories of institutions, they are generally
12. See, e.g., American Bar Association: Business Law Section, Comment Letter
Relating to Section 201 of JOBS Act (April 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobstitle-ii/jobstitleii-7.pdf (discussing how removal of the solicitation ban is a cost-effective
mechanism to increase capital formation); Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation
While Protecting Investors: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of
Law, Columbia University Law School) (claiming that the removal of the ban “will simplify
private placements and allow smaller issuers to reach more investors at low cost”);
BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter Relating to Section 201 of JOBS Act (May 3, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-10.pdf, [hereinafter BlackRock Letter]
(explaining why the solicitation ban was too restrictive); Hedge Fund Ass’n Ltd., Comment
Letter
Relating
to
Section
201
of
JOBS
Act
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-22.pdf (asserting that removal of the
solicitation ban is “fundamental to the continued growth of the hedge fund industry and that
allowing general solicitations to further that outcome will encourage emerging managers to
continue to enter the industry.”).
13. See, e.g., Fund Democracy, Inc. et al., Comment Letter Relating to Section 201 of
JOBS Act (May 24, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-14.pdf
(suggesting that the removal of the ban will lead to an increase in fraudulent conduct);
William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth of Mass., Comment
Letter
Relating
to
Section
201
of
JOBS
Act
(July
2,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-37.pdf (discussing the possibility of
Rule 506 offerings becoming the new “Wild West” for fraudulent advisers to induce
prospective investors); Andrea L. Seidt, Comm’r, Ohio Div. of Sec., Comment Letter
Relating to Section 201 of JOBS Act (July 3, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobstitle-ii/jobstitleii-38.pdf (stating that “[a]ccredited investors present prime, well-funded
targets to scam artists who will not hesitate to take advantage of the new general solicitation
and general advertising freedoms to troll for victims.”).
14. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 33–
34 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF
REPORT].
15. Id.
16. See generally The Differences Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds, INV. CO.
INST. (Apr. 2007), http://www.ici.org/investor_ed/brochures/faqs_hedge (laying out the
differences between the two investment vehicles).
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012) (defining “accredited investor”).
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exempt from the arduous registration requirements that typically apply to
mutual funds. 18 As opposed to focusing on the direct impact to issuers
and/or the inducement of fraudulent issuers, this Article focuses on the
extent to which advertising could actually improve protection for this
subset of investors.
Generally, our federal securities laws strive to enhance investor
protection by: (1) providing investors with more information and greater
transparency to make better investment decisions; (2) providing regulators
with more information and greater efficiency to better detect investment
fraud; and (3) deterring investment advisers from participating in
fraudulent investment activities. Although the very nature of the JOBS Act
is to loosen regulations that apply to private companies, permitting general
solicitations can actually support these fundamental goals of investor
protection frameworks. More specifically, this Article argues that
advertising could enhance investor protection for this subset of investors as
it will likely improve transparency, promote healthy competition, and in
some cases, make it more difficult for fraudulent advisers to induce
prospective investors.
As to improving transparency, this Article highlights how the
solicitation ban contributed to the general opaqueness that historically
shrouded the industry. 19 Under the previous restrictions, since the
definition of solicitation was extremely broad, hedge fund advisers were
severely restricted from communicating any meaningful information about
their funds in a broad medium. 20 For example, an accredited investor who
was interested in learning more about the industry encountered difficulties
in accessing detailed information from a large range of hedge funds. 21
Going forward, hedge funds will probably publish more informative
websites, engage in greater communications at industry events, and share
more business-related information to the press. 22 In effect, enhancing the
flow of information will give hedge fund investors more tools to optimize
their investment decisions and will also help researchers and regulators to
more clearly define the hazards presented by the exponential growth of
these private vehicles. 23
With respect to improving competition, this Article argues that the
removal of the solicitation ban will promote healthy competition within the

18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (referencing the differences between
mutual funds and hedge funds).
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.
22. See discussion infra Part II.C.
23. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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industry. 24 Because of the numerous benefits that typically result from the
sustainment of competitive markets, several legal frameworks, both in the
United States and abroad, will serve to protect markets from monopolistic
forces. 25 For example, removing the solicitation ban will make it easier for
emerging hedge funds to effectively compete with their larger, moreestablished counterparts, which could in turn foster innovation.26
Increasing competition may also create more clearly defined industry
norms and standards, which could lead to proliferation of higher quality
products within the industry. 27 Overall, this increased competition will
eventually help to optimize investor choice, facilitate innovation, and
encourage investment in higher quality products.
This Article further argues that the removal of the solicitation ban can
actually deter fraud in certain respects. 28 Having to operate in a more
transparent marketplace, where higher quality products are heavily
promoted and marketed, will make it more difficult for fraudulent advisers
to dupe unsuspecting investors. 29 The removal of the solicitation ban may
also loosen the reliance on trusted referrals, which assisted in the
perpetuation of the Madoff scandal and other comparable Ponzi schemes. 30
Moreover, since advisers are now required to notify the SEC of their
intentions to advertise on their Form D filings, they will be less likely to
effectuate their schemes through false advertising. 31 The existing federal
securities laws, particularly the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
“Advisers Act”), also serve as additional layers of protection. 32 These
existing frameworks heavily regulate performance presentations,
testimonials, and any other material information that would appear on an
investor communication. 33
Although the removal of the solicitation ban is generally a step in the
right direction for hedge fund investors, future regulatory challenges still
remain. 34 These challenges include the inherent conflicts of interest and the
lack of standardization in hedge fund valuations, the fraud loophole created
by smaller funds that escape oversight under the Advisers Act, and the
potential increase in speculation that could significantly compromise

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
Id.
See discussion infra Part V.
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investor confidence. 35 For instance, two different advertisements for
competing hedge funds, each trading the same illiquid securities, equally
promote an annual return of 10%. However, since hedge funds are not
subject to standardized valuation mechanisms, it is difficult for investors to
adequately compare such figures with certainty. 36 In addition, smaller
advisers escape federal oversight under the Advisers Act, even though
various studies have shown that they are frequently more susceptible to
fraud. Thus, requiring Advisers Act registration for all advisers who utilize
general solicitations may be the most viable solution to address this
loophole. Also, the increasing growth of the industry could lead to an
increase in speculation within the broader capital markets. 37 This could
significantly compromise investor confidence, causing liquidity problems
and valuation discrepancies in the long-run. 38
The valuation challenges can be resolved through future regulatory
actions that would require third-party oversight of the specific calculations
and/or mandating standardized calculations for particular hedge fund
investments. 39 It is too early to determine whether there is a significant
correlation between advertising and speculation. Even if speculation does
increase within the broader capital markets, it is equally difficult to
measure the resulting harm, if any, to investor confidence and capital
production. Due to this uncertainty, the SEC and/or Congress should
mandate the completion of a study by the SEC’s Division of Economic and
Risk Analysis, which would rigorously investigate the resulting speculation
that is created by the ever-growing hedge fund industry. 40 This study
should be completed within two years after the final solicitation rules are
adopted by the SEC.
In summary, Part II briefly highlights the previous legal framework
that broadly prohibited general advertisements and explains how this
restriction was likely over-inclusive. Part III then illustrates how the
removal of the solicitation ban can fuel healthy competition within the
industry, which can optimize investor choice, lead to greater innovation,
and promote higher quality products. Part IV discusses the extent to which
the removal of the solicitation ban can actually deter fraud — the resulting
increase in competition will make it more difficult for fraudulent advisers
to solicit prospective investors. It then explains how both the new and
existing regulatory frameworks will serve as additional layers of protection

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
See discussion infra Part V.A(iii).
See discussion infra Part V.B.
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from fraudulent communications. Part V briefly identifies the remaining
regulatory challenges that have not been sufficiently addressed, which
include: conflicts of interest and the lack of standardization with respect to
valuations, the fraud loophole created by smaller funds that escape
oversight under the Advisers Act, and the potential increase in speculation
that could significantly compromise investor confidence. Part V also
suggests possible solutions to these regulatory challenges, some of which
include third-party oversight over valuations and/or standardized
methodologies for particular hedge fund investments. In addition, all
advisers who utilize general solicitations should be required to register
under the Advisers Act to ensure that all such investors are receiving
comparable disclosures. A study should also be undertaken by the SEC to
rigorously study the resulting increase in speculation.
I. TRANSPARENCY
Part I summarizes how lifting the advertising ban could enhance
investor protection by increasing transparency related to prospective hedge
fund investments. This part begins by briefly outlining the previous legal
framework that broadly prohibited general advertisements. It continues by
explaining how this restriction was likely over-inclusive, which led to
various informational asymmetries between prospective investors and their
potential hedge fund investments. Part I concludes by discussing the ways
in which the new framework will likely improve transparency through
more detailed websites, greater communications at industry events, and
increased information sharing with industry related press. Enhancing the
flow of information will help hedge fund investors to optimize their
investment decisions and will also help researchers and regulators to more
clearly define the hazards of the exponential growth of these private
vehicles.
A. Previous Framework
For the most part, the federal securities laws are not intended to
regulate transactions that are private in nature or where the “public benefits
are too remote.” 41 More specifically, under Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), any transaction not involving
a public offering is exempt from the arduous registration requirements of
the federal securities laws. 42 Since the statute does not provide a specific
41. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC
IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
42. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
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definition of the term “public,” issuers were historically reluctant in relying
on this exemption, as an inadvertent public offering would result in a right
of rescission for its underlying investors. 43 In response, the SEC, as well as
the Supreme Court, provided additional guidance for interpreting this
pivotal term through a series of releases and opinions. 44
In 1982, in an effort to provide even greater certainty for issuers
relying on this exemption, the SEC promulgated three safe harbors
commonly referred to as Rules 504, 505, and 506 under Regulation D. 45
These rules sought to provide issuers with bright-line standards for
determining whether companies were legitimately operating as private
vehicles. 46 Exempt investment companies such as venture capital funds,
private equity funds, and hedge funds frequently select Rule 506, since it
allows them to raise an unlimited amount of capital from an unlimited
number of accredited investors. 47 In exchange however, vehicles relying
on Rule 506 were prohibited from advertising their exempt offerings to the
general public, so as to preserve the private nature of these entities, and
perhaps to restrict the size of the industry. 48
While Regulation D does not provide a specific definition of the terms
“general advertising” or “general solicitation,” 49 Rule 502(c) provides a list
of examples of the kinds of communications that could constitute a
solicitation to the general public. 50 Under this rule, general solicitations
can include “[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other communication
published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over
television or radio” 51 and “any seminar or meeting whose attendees have
43. If an issuer mistakenly relies on a 4(a)(2) exemption, then such issuer has
essentially sold unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act. See
id. § 77e (stating that non-exempt unregistered securities are unlawful). Thus, an issuer in
this scenario would face liability under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, which
generally grants investors a right of rescission. Id. § 77l(a)(2).
44. Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 50,
65–67 (2012) (describing the evolution of the sophisticated investor doctrine, which
presumes that certain wealthy and institutional investors can adequately fend for
themselves).
45. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6,389, 24 SEC Docket 1166 (Mar. 8,
1982) (debuting the uniform notice of sales to be used for all offerings).
46. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–506 (2011) (providing conditions for fulfilling
private placement exemption).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
48. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013).
49. The terms “solicitation” and “advertisement” (and any related variations) are used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
51. Id. § 230.502(c)(1).
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been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising.” 52
Nevertheless, other categories of communications, not specifically listed in
Rule 502(c) or addressed in an SEC no-action letter or enforcement action,
could still be considered unlawful. 53 The SEC has consistently reiterated
that Rule 502(c) inquiries depend on the unique facts and circumstances of
each particular case.
Thus, determining whether a particular
communication runs afoul of 502(c) is uncertain and unpredictable.
Given this broad restriction on communications with prospective
investors, issuers relying on Rule 506 were only allowed to solicit investors
with whom they had a sufficient preexisting relationship. 54 Such
preexisting relationships are deemed sufficient only if the nature of the
relationship enables the issuer (or person acting on its behalf) to be aware
of the financial circumstances or sophistication of the person with whom
the relationship exists. 55 The issuer must also acquire this relationship
before the terms of the offering are created and before the contemplated
offering begins. 56 As a result, hedge funds would often restrict marketing
activities to personal or close networks of potential investors with whom
they already had a relationship. 57
If an issuer did not have access to these kinds of preexisting
relationships with accredited investors, it could simply contract for such
access from registered financial intermediaries, such as brokers or
placement agents. 58 When utilizing this option, “funds . . . enter into
formal placement arrangements with major investment firms such as
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and the like. These firms are typically
compensated through a placement fee or sales charge . . . .” 59 This practice
has been deemed legally sound by the SEC as these intermediaries are
52. Id. § 230.502(c)(2).
53. See id. § 230.502(c) (stating that the provided examples of general solicitations are
nonexclusive).
54. Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21962, 1985 WL 548507 (April 19,
1985).
55. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680
(Dec. 4, 1985).
56. Id.
57. See Impact of “Private Fund” Advertising, DARIEN CAPITAL SERVICES BLOG (July
16,
2013),
http://blog.dariancs.com/2013/07/16/impact-of-private-fund-advertising/
(describing the “prevalence of ‘business card’ type websites” due to the limited information
that hedge funds could provide the public prior to the JOBS Act).
58. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680 (Dec. 3,
1985) (authorizing use of suitability questionnaires for creating substantive relationships for
offering purposes); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL 55679 (Dec. 3, 1985) (sanctioning the use of questionnaires sent to a limited
number of local businesspeople by the broker-dealer’s account executives).
59. Ethan W. Johnson, Hedge Fund Marketing Overview, 7 J. INV. COMPLIANCE 48, 48
(2006), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Johnson_HedgeFundMrkting.pdf.
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simply soliciting investors who have a general interest in investing in
private placements. 60 These solicitations often take the form of online
suitability questionnaires, which are designed to determine whether a
prospective investor qualifies as accredited under Rule 501. 61 However,
the suitability questionnaire (or solicitation) may not mention any particular
private placement offering and must occur prior to any contemplated
offering of an issuer. 62
B. Solicitation Ban Likely Over-Inclusive
The deliberate uncertainty regarding the definition of “general
solicitation” has made it difficult for advisers to predict whether a
communication would run afoul of Regulation D. As previously discussed,
if a hedge fund adviser relied on incorrect legal analysis and inadvertently
made a communication later deemed unlawful under 502(c), such adviser
would have faced dire legal consequences. 63 Under this scenario, the hedge
fund adviser would likely have lost its Regulation D exemption and face
rescission of all of its previously sold interests. 64 As a result, the
application of this ban had become over-inclusive since hedge funds were
restricted from communicating meaningful information to prospective
investors.
For example, direct communications made between accredited
investors and prospective hedge fund advisers were severely limited. Even
if a communication by a hedge fund adviser was directed exclusively to
accredited investors (with whom the adviser had no preexisting
relationship), it would still run afoul of 502(c). 65 Similarly, any
information that a hedge fund adviser shared with accredited investors at
seminars, meetings, or trade events regarding its underlying fund(s) also
subjected the adviser to liability under the Securities Act. 66 To the extent
60. See supra note 58 an accompanying text (giving examples of permissible practices
using broker-dealers).
61. See IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996) (permitting
use of electronic coupons or cards to indicate interest in an offering).
62. Id.
63. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the consequences of
mistaken reliance on Section 4(a)(2)).
64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (stating that liability for violation may
include rescission).
65. See Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 27
SEC Docket 347, 360 (Mar. 3, 1983) (“The mere fact that a solicitation is directed only to
accredited investors will not mean that the solicitation is in compliance with Rule 502(c).”).
66. See, e.g., Gerald Klein & Assocs., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8585,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,986, 2005 WL 1615435 (July 8, 2005) (reporting
that where hedge funds were organized in violation of the Securities Act, and not exempted
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that accredited investors attended an industry event to learn more about
specific hedge fund investments, the advertising restriction curtailed such
investors from gaining detailed information directly from advisers.
Furthermore, the restricted communications were not limited to information
regarding an upcoming offering. Rather, any information regarding
fundraising events, upcoming financial changes, or anything else pertaining
to the issuer’s business could “be construed as implied offers or as efforts
to prime the market . . . .” 67 Also, responding to unsolicited requests for
information about a hedge fund could also run afoul of solicitation ban.
For instance, Phillip Goldstein, the hedge fund manager of Bulldog
Investments, was subjected to an enforcement action by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts because he responded to an e-mail
request from an investor who requested specific information about his
fund. 68 As a result, lawyers generally advise their hedge fund clients to
develop scripted responses for unsolicited requests for information. An
example of such response is as follows: “This is a private placement only
for qualified purchasers who are personally known to us or to our
placement agent. We do not send our private placement memorandum in
response to unsolicited inquiries. Thank you for your interest in us.” 69 In
order for an investor to gain access to specific information regarding a
hedge fund, the investor must first establish a relationship with either the
adviser or a qualified placement agent before the contemplated offering
begins.
Communications made through electronic media could also constitute
an unlawful communication under 502(c). The SEC further provided that
the use of any unrestricted website constitutes an unlawful general
solicitation. 70 Thus, hedge fund websites are generally password-protected

therefrom, the investment advisers responsible for their organization are liable too); Brian
Prendergast, Exchange Act Release No. 44,632, 2001 WL 872693 (Aug. 1, 2001) (holding
securities broker in violation of Exchange Act due to improper solicitation through a private
placement memorandum for a hedge fund).
67. Private Offering Dos and Don’ts: Dealing with the Press and Avoiding a General
LEWIS
&
BOCKIUS
LLP
(2013),
at
3,
Solicitation,
MORGAN,
http://www.morganlewis.com/documents/VCPEFdeskbook/VCPEFdeskbook_PrivateOfferi
ngDosAndDonts.pdf; see also REMCO Sec. Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL
55621 (July 22, 1985) (finding that press releases describing successful completion of oil
wells and other notable business events would constitute an unlawful general solicitation).
68. Jeff Benjamin, What’s So Bad About Hedge Fund Advertising, Anyway?, INV.
NEWS
(July
12,
2013,
3:22PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130712/BLOG12/130719965
(depicting
Goldstein’s legal troubles despite the solicitee not investing in his hedge fund).
69. Private Offerings Dos & Don’ts, supra note 67, at 3.
70. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No.
7233, 60 SEC Docket 1091, 1100 (Oct. 6, 1995) (prohibiting the placement of offering
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so as to prevent access from the general public. 71 Only pre-qualified
accredited investors can actually access such websites. 72 Due to this
massive restriction, the websites published by hedge funds are typically
meager and uninformative. 73 Jay Gould, a partner in the investment funds
practice at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, recently reiterated the
challenges of interpreting the solicitation ban as it pertains to electronic
media. 74 He stated, “[d]eciphering the boundaries of the ban has become
increasingly difficult with the rise of the Internet and social media, which
make available widely information about hedge funds . . . . Hedge-fund
managers frequently grapple with whether any public statements, or even a
company website, open them up to regulatory action.” 75
With respect to press releases and interviews, any published statement
by a hedge fund adviser could also violate Section 502(c). 76 The broad
reach of this restriction is aptly summarized in a comment letter published
by the Managed Funds Association (the “MFA”), an industry group that
represents a large fraction of the global alternative investment industry.77
In this comment letter, Richard Baker, the President and CEO of the MFA,
stated that “private fund managers generally will not respond to press
inquiries, even to correct inaccurate reports that will be published and
could potentially harm their firms.” 78 Furthermore, any announcement of
materials on a website even if access is restricted to individuals who properly answer the
access question).
71. See Lamp Techs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 278984 (May 29, 1998)
(hereinafter Lamp Techs. 1998) (permitting the placement of offering materials on a website
that is password-protected regardless of whether a subscription is purchased or a
determination that the investors are “qualified eligible participants”); see also Lamp Techs.,
Inc., SEC No-Action letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May 29, 1997) (describing the process by
which accredited investors pay a subscription fee to access a password-protected website to
access private offerings).
72. Lamp Techs. 1998, supra note 71, at 1.
73. Private Offerings Dos & Don’ts, supra note 67, at 3.
74. Juliet Chung, Jobs Bill Opens Door to Hedgie Advertising, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/03/28/jobs-bill-opens-door-to-hedgie-advertising.
75. Id.
76. See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS:
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 4.8 (2013) (commenting that an interview may be
construed as a solicitation if it referenced a private fund even if the intent was not to solicit).
77. The MFA is “an advocacy, education, and communications organization
established to enable hedge fund and managed futures firms in the alternative investment
industry to participate in public policy discourse, share best practices and learn from peers,
and communicate the industry’s contributions to the global economy.” About MFA,
MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, http://www.managedfunds.org/about-mfa (last visited Apr. 9,
2014).
78. Richard Baker, President & CEO of Managed Fund Ass’n, Comment Letter
regarding Petition for Rulemaking on Rule 502 of Regulation D (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2012/petn4-643.pdf (making the argument that removing
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upcoming business changes to the press, even if no particular offer is
mentioned, could also violate the solicitation ban because the SEC had
historically viewed these communications as implied offers or sales. 79 In
addition, the mere act of an adviser (or adviser representative) mentioning a
fund name in an interview could be viewed as an unlawful advertisement. 80
This strict outcome applies even if the adviser did not intend to advertise
his/her fund at the time of the interview. 81 To mitigate the harsh effects of
the solicitation ban, lawyers frequently give hedge funds the following
advice when responding to inquiries from the press: “[1] Avoid identifying
by name any hedge fund or private fund . . .; [2] Avoid specific discussions
of past performance . . .[3] Avoid mentioning specific securities
positions . . .; and [4] Avoid mentioning any material, non-public
Overall, lawyers advise hedge fund clients to
information . . . .” 82
communicate as little information as possible when dealing with any
inquiries related to their funds.
C. Lifting Advertising Ban Could Enhance Transparency
Lifting the ban on advertising could enhance transparency within the
entire industry, which could in turn enhance investor protection. 83 As
discussed in Part II.B above, the restrictions on advertising implemented
under Regulation D were likely over-inclusive as they chilled
communications between hedge fund advisers and prospective investors.
These sweeping communication restrictions have contributed to the general
opacity and mystery that has historically shrouded the industry. The SEC
even advocated for lifting the ban in its often-cited Implications of the
Growth of Hedge Funds study, in which the SEC specifically
recommended that the “[c]ommission consider eliminating the prohibition
on general solicitation or advertising in offerings by hedge funds . . .” in an
effort to improve transparency. 84 In effect, increased information about the
hedge fund universe within the public sphere could serve as a vital tool for

the solicitation ban will improve transparency because it will give investors more access to
information relating to prospective hedge fund investments).
79. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, § 4.8.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. §5.12.
83. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Op-Ed., Transparency is More Powerful Than Regulation,
ST.
J.,
Mar.
30,
2009,
at
A21,
available
at
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123837223623167841.html (“Better transparency is the
surest way to make markets more efficient and less volatile. Market wisdom results when
more people access better information.”).
84. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at xii.
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prospective investors who are interested in learning more about the general
characteristics of the business. Steven Nadel, a partner at Seward & Kissel
LLP who specializes in hedge funds and alternative investments, similarly
believes that:
“[t]he lift on the advertising ban will educate a broader group
about the type of private offerings available . . . . ‘There’s plenty
of wealthy Americans who may not be super sophisticated when
it comes to investing in alternatives . . . . It will create more
knowledge, more transparency, [and] more understanding of the
entire alternative industry.’” 85
In fact, many commentators agree that lifting the solicitation ban
could improve the public’s perception of the industry, which is typically
characterized as being secretive, sinister, and deeply opaque. 86 To the
extent that hedge funds are actively engaged in activities that actually
improve the global economy, such as providing much needed liquidity to
the markets, investing in distressed debt, or even participating in charitable
causes, the removal of the solicitation ban can help to highlight these good
deeds. 87 Hedge funds will no longer encounter stringent liabilities under
the federal securities laws in highlighting their various strengths. With the
removal of the solicitation ban, investors will have a more complete picture
of the hedge fund universe.
Although it is difficult to predict with certainty the full extent to which
hedge funds will utilize this new power to advertise, the marketing changes
instituted by funds will likely be incremental. At the outset, hedge funds
will probably create more informative websites that are publicly accessible,
become more candid with the media regarding their business and risk

85. Jesse Hamilton & Margaret Collins, Hedge Funds Cleared to Advertise Under SEC
Proposal, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 29, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0828/hedge-fund-marketing-could-begin-new-era-as-sec-set-for-proposal.html.
86. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Walk a Hard Line Between Silence and
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C7 (reporting on the small group of hedge funds
seeking permission to talk to the media about their funds on the record); John Lovallo, JOBS
Act; Hedge Fund Communications Options Poised to Expand, JD SUPRA, (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/jobs-act-hedge-fund-communications-opti-77250
(describing the heavy scrutiny inevitable in hedge fund marketing’s legalization); Marine
Cole, Hedge Funds Won’t Rush to Advertise Even After Ban Lifted: Largest Firms Most
Likely to Test the Waters, But Restrictions Remain, ADVERTISING AGE (July 12, 2013),
http://adage.com/article/news/hedge-funds-rush-advertise-ban-lifted/243047
(suggesting
that smaller firms may lead the charge to try marketing).
87. Lovallo, supra note 86; see also Tom Hals, Hedge Funds on the Hunt in Detroit,
May
8,
2013,
available
at
REUTERS,
http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/05/08/analysis-hedge-funds-in-search-distress-takelook-at-detroit (discussing hedge funds’ exploration of buying distressed municipal debt of
Detroit).
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management practices, and “engage in more natural marketing with
contacts made at venues like industry conferences.” 88 It is highly unlikely
that hedge funds will pursue widely disseminated television campaigns or
radio broadcasts. 89 Many hedge funds will simply avoid implementing
massive advertising campaigns because they are still restricted to
accredited investors. 90 As such, hedge funds do not have the need to
market to broader audiences that would include large numbers of retail
investors.
Moreover, the final rule adopted by the SEC puts a greater burden on
advisers, who choose to utilize this new advertising power, to verify that
prospective investors qualify as accredited. The SEC recommends that
such a verification process “take into account the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding each transaction, including the nature of the
purchaser, the amount and type of information the purchaser has about the
issuer, and the nature of the offering (including the manner in which the
purchaser was solicited).” 91 Previously, hedge funds could simply rely on
investors to “check-the-box” next to written accredited investor
representations on subscription agreements and other investor contracts.
Tower Fund Manager, a prominent hedge fund administrator, predicts that
this heightened verification process will cause increased regulatory
“scrutiny . . . in proportion to the magnitude of the marketing
campaign run by the fund manager. Providing information about
fund strategy and returns on websites or speaking on panels at
industry events; less scrutiny. Sponsoring a blimp during the
Super Bowl; a knock on the door at half time could upstage any
wardrobe malfunction.” 92
88. Nathan J. Greene, SEC JOBS Act Rulemaking Creates Opportunities and Potential
Burdens for Hedge Funds Contemplating General Solicitation and Advertising, SHEARMAN
&
STERLING
LLP
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/News/2013/08/Greene-PublishesArticle-in-iThe-Hedge-Fund-Law-__/Files/View-article-SEC-JOBS-Act-RulemakingCreates-Opp__/FileAttachment/HFLR-Reprint-71813-SEC-JOBS-Act-RulemakingCreat__.pdf; see also Risk Roadmap: Hedge Funds and Investors’ Evolving Approach to
MELLON,
at
2
(Aug.
2012),
Risk,
BNY
http://www.bnymellon.com/foresight/pdf/riskroadmap-0812.pdf (commenting on the
increased transparency of hedge funds as result of the JOBS Act); Susan Lyon, The Hedge
Fund Advertising Ban Lifted: What Should Investors Know?, NERD WALLET (July 24, 2013),
http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/sec-hedge-fund-advertising-ban-lifted.
89. Cole, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Richard Heller & Mark Maxwell, The JOBS Act: Jumpstart My CTA, CTA
INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.ctaintelligence.com/the-jobs-act-jumpstart-mycta.
92. Tower Fund Services, SEC Ruling on Hedge Fund Advertising Ban Will Create
WEB
(July
16,
2013),
Challenges
and
Opportunities,
PR
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While accredited investors are theoretically fit to fend for themselves
under the federal securities laws, and arguably are excluded from federal
protections from investing in an opaque market, enhancing hedge fund
transparency will inevitably support the changing landscape of the
investment company industry. Increasingly, institutional investors, such as
pension plans, insurance companies, and endowments, are adding hedge
funds as a vital component to their underlying portfolios. And the risks and
benefits of these hedge fund investments are indirectly passed on to the
underlying retail investor constituents of these institutional investors. Yet
many institutions are flocking to hedge funds because they enjoy greater
flexibility to guarantee absolute returns through derivatives trading and
unrestrained leverage, which are minimally available to their mutual fund
counterparts. 93 For instance, the New York City retirement systems
recently made the controversial decision to increase its hedge fund
investments from $450 million, to $3.5 billion, 94 and the Princeton
endowment has earmarked as much as 25 percent of its portfolio for hedge
fund investments. 95 To the extent that hedge funds become an integral
investment option to an increasing pool of accredited investors, such
investors, along with any underlying retail constituents, will greatly benefit
from investing in an industry whose participants can freely communicate
its fundamental benefits and risks. Lifting the solicitation ban is a pivotal
step in facilitating the flow of information to this growing group of
investors.
In addition, several surveys have found that hedge fund investors have
recently started to demand more transparency from industry participants.
One such survey found that “82 percent of [hedge fund adviser]
respondents reported an increase in demand for transparency from
investors.” 96 Although transparency has greatly improved, especially since
the dawn of the financial crisis, many investors still see the opacity of the
industry as a primary concern. 97 Lifting the advertising ban will likely
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/7/prweb10927179.htm.
93. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14.
94. Daniel Solin, The New York Pension Plan Folly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Mar. 7, 2013, http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/On-Retirement/2013/03/07/the-newyork-pension-plan-folly.
95. Gillian Wee, Princeton Endowment Plans to Cut Ranks of Private-Equity
Managers in Half, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1022/princeton-endowment-plans-to-cut-ranks-of-private-equity-managers-in-half.html.
96. The Evolution of an Industry: 2012 KPMG/AIMA Global Hedge Fund Survey,
COOPERATIVE,
at
5
(May
2012),
KPMG
INTERNATIONAL
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/the-evolution-ofan-industry/Documents/the-evolution-of-an-industry.pdf.
97. See THE SHIFTING HEDGE FUND LANDSCAPE: THE NEW DYNAMICS OF HEDGE FUND
COMPETITIVENESS,
SEI
(2012),
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make funds more willing to share information, particularly since they will
no longer be jeopardizing their business by freely sharing information with
a growing list of investors.
This increased transparency will also give regulators, as well as
researchers, more tools to appropriately investigate the perceived hazards
associated with the continuous growth of the industry. As of February
2009, there were approximately 18,000 hedge funds in existence. 98 This
number has likely grown and will continue to grow as investors
increasingly allocate capital to alternative strategies. 99 Some of the hazards
of this exponential growth include unrestrained leverage and derivatives
trading, which also lead to an increase in speculation in the broader capital
markets. Assuming that a large number of hedge funds will eventually
utilize this new advertising power, outsiders will have more tools to
effectively investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the industry. Both
researchers and regulators will be able to scan hedge fund websites, which
will presumably be more informative and educational. They will also be
able to review interviews and other press releases for comparative and
educational purposes. Additionally, they will be able to attend industry
events and seminars where meaningful information about various industry
participants would be freely shared. Overall, the increased transparency
that will result from the removal of the solicitation ban will help outsiders
better define the problems and accompanying solutions to the exponential
growth of these private vehicles.
II. COMPETITION
Part II illustrates how the removal of the solicitation ban can enhance
investor protection by fueling healthy competition within the industry. It
begins by underscoring the general benefits to consumers that arise from
competitive markets, and explains why such markets are protected by legal
frameworks in both the United States and abroad. Part II then clarifies how
advertising can help to increase competition within the hedge fund

http://www.seic.com/IMS/SEI_2012HedgeFundWhitePaper_Pt2_Summary.pdf.
(finding
that 57% of investors consider detail on the use of leverage the “top unmet information
need”).
FUNDS
ASS’N,
98. See
Hedge
Fund
Adviser
FAQ’s,
MANAGED
https://www.managedfunds.org/hedge-fund-investors/faqs/hedge-fund-advisor/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2014) (citing PerTrac’s February 2009 data on hedge funds).
99. CITIGROUP INC., THE RISE OF LIQUID ALTERNATIVES & THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF
ALTERNATIVE PRODUCT MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTION 5 (2013), available at
http://icg.citi.com/transactionservices/home/demo/tutorials8/Hedge_Fund_May2013/
(predicting that “the global demand for liquid alternatives for the retail audience [will]
reach[] $939 billion by 2017”).
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industry, which will give investors more tools to better optimize their
investment decisions. It continues by identifying an additional benefit of
competitive markets insomuch as they foster innovation, particularly
amongst new market entrants. Part II concludes with a general discussion
of how increased competition could create more clearly defined industry
norms and standards, which could lead to higher quality products
dominating the hedge fund marketplace.
A. Optimizing Investor Choice
Competition generally refers to “a struggle or contention for
superiority, and . . . a striving for the custom and business of people in the
market place.” 100 In 1776, Adam Smith was one of the first to recognize
the importance of securing competitive markets in the broader economy.
He found that sustaining competition is extremely beneficial for society
because it forces business owners to better serve their customers. 101 When
faced with stringent competition from rivals, businesses are incentivized to
make superior products, while maintaining the lowest possible prices and
production costs. 102 These benefits were reiterated in a white paper that
was presented to Parliament, which stated that “[w]ith strong competition
firms are forced to work hard to win and keep customers. As a result,
competition drives down prices and drives up quality and choice.”103 When
compared to a monopoly, where a single firm or subset of firms controls an
entire industry, competitive markets yield greater efficiency in various
aspects of any business. 104 Due to the many benefits of maintaining
competitive markets, several laws exist, both in the United States and
internationally, “to protect the process of competition in order to maximize
consumer welfare.” 105 There is a global consensus that protecting
competition is a necessary endeavor to create better functioning markets. 106
As discussed in Part II.C, this new power to advertise will create a
100. RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 3 (7th ed. 2012).
101. GUNNAR NIELS, ET AL., ECONOMICS FOR COMPETITION LAWYERS 2–3 (2011).
102. Id. at 3.
103. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, A WORLD CLASS COMPETITION REGIME,
2001, Cm. 5233, at 1 (U.K.).
104. WHISH, supra note 100, at 4.
105. Id.; see also Niels, supra note 101, at 3 (recognizing that people in the same trade
have a tendency to get together, converse, and often create the unintended consequence of
monopolistic behavior); ROBERT BALDWIN, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 19 (2nd ed. 2012) (identifying deficient markets in which firms
behave in such a way as to inhibit “healthy competition”).
106. See WHISH, supra note 100, at 18 (“[T]here is probably a greater global consensus
on the desirability of competition and free markets today than at any time in the history of
human economic behavior.”).

MARTIN_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1162

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:43 PM

[Vol. 16.4

more transparent market, which will enhance competition amongst hedge
funds.
Competition is improved when “[b]uyers have complete
information about the product being sold and the prices charged by each
firm . . . .” 107 In removing the solicitation ban, investors will have more
access to information about the investment strategies, fees and other key
attributes of a larger multitude of funds. This enhanced transparency will
help investors better optimize their hedge fund investments by making it
easier to compare a larger range of competing products. Investors’ ability
to compare data among various investment opportunities is arguably one of
the most important skills associated with optimizing investment choices. 108
Providing investors with comparable data among multiple hedge funds
allows them to appropriately ascertain whether a particular firm is
competitive, whether it conforms to industry standards, and whether it is
the most optimal use of their limited capital. 109
While these investors often constitute high-net-worth individuals and
prominent institutions that are performing substantial due diligence on each
prospective investment, the due diligence process is extremely expensive
and time consuming, which makes it difficult for investors to gain an
accurate overview of the broader hedge fund marketplace. According to
one study, a standard due diligence investigation for a single hedge fund
can entail between 75 and 100 hours. 110 Andrew Golden, the President of
the Princeton University Investment Company, previously stated that his
company utilizes an extremely rigorous due diligence process in which
approximately 400 hours are spent investigating a single fund, and 70
additional hours per year are spent doing ongoing monitoring. 111 Instead of
simply focusing on a single hedge fund strategy, enhanced competition can
provide investors with a broader overview of multiple hedge fund products.
This can be viewed as “enabling market choices” so that investors can
more appropriately allocate their capital to optimal hedge fund
investments. 112
107. Definition
of
Perfect
Competition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/perfectcompetition.asp.
108. Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory
Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 702 (2004).
109. See id. (concluding that comparison of firms by public shareholders of a given firm
is “likely to instigate voluntary disclosure”).
110. Stephen J. Brown et al., Hedge Fund Due Diligence: A Source of Alpha in a Hedge
Fund Portfolio Strategy 10 (New York University Stern School of Business Working Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
FIN-07-032,
2011),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016904.
111. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 111 (2007) (statement of Andrew K. Golden, President,
Princeton Univ. Inv. Co).
112. Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency in the Administration of Laws: The Relationship
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In a similar vein, several industry participants agree that the
solicitation ban has made it difficult for investors to make optimal
investment decisions. For example, Richard Lashley, co-founder of PL
Capital LLC, previously noted that “[u]nder the current opaque system,
hedge fund investors usually find only one or two opportunities before
making a decision . . . . With advertising, investors could review numerous
possible strategies before choosing one.” 113 James Hedges, founder,
president and chief investment officer of LJH Global Investments LLC,
similarly noted that “[i]nvestors should be able to see the entire universe of
choices available to them, and as a result, they will be able to make
informed decisions.” 114 Kennon, a best-selling financial author, also
observed that the advertising ban “[made] it nearly impossible for you to
learn about hedge fund opportunities unless you ha[d] an existing
relationship with an affiliated broker-dealer.” 115 Douglas Berman, a
managing member at a law firm, also stated that allowing hedge funds to
advertise would cause “more investors [to] gain access to more deals as
people become accustomed to distributing offering documents in a manner
that was previously considered to be general solicitation.” 116
Overall, several industry participants and, at one point, the SEC staff,
have concluded that the solicitation ban was largely outdated. Removing
the ban is a step in the right direction, as it will serve as a mechanism to
improve competition within the industry, which will help investors to
optimize investment decisions within the burgeoning private fund industry.
However, certain regulatory loopholes still remain, particularly with
respect to developing standardized valuation mechanisms and resolving
conflicts of interest related to valuation practices. Resolving these
loopholes would further assist in optimizing investor choice, but these
issues have not been specifically addressed by the Advisers Act or the
newly adopted JOBS Act. These loopholes are further discussed in Part
IV.A below.
B. Promoting Innovation
An additional benefit of a competitive market is that “it [may] have
the dynamic effect of stimulating innovation as competitors strive to

Between Differing Justifications for Transparency and Differing Views of Administrative
Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 971 (2011).
113. Ron Orol, Pitching the Hedge, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 3, 2003.
114. Id.
115. Joshua Kennon, Investing in a Hedge Fund Can Be Difficult, ABOUT.COM,
http://beginnersinvest.about.com/od/hedgefunds/a/how-to-invest-in-hedge-funds.htm.
116. Lyon, supra note 88.
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produce new and better products for consumers.” 117 As to the hedge fund
industry, removing the solicitation ban will make it easier for smaller,
emerging funds, which tend to offer more innovative strategies at lower
prices, to more easily access this market. 118 The previous solicitation ban
made it difficult for such funds to effectively compete with their larger,
more-established counterparts, many of which have throngs of investors
waiting to invest. 119
Under this prior regime, since any broad-based communication was
severely restricted as described in Part I.A above, hedge fund advisers
could only solicit investors for which they had a sufficient preexisting
relationship. Since new advisers often do not have access to these
relationships, they would have to purchase such access from placement
agents, who would have already constructed databases comprised of
prescreened accredited investors. This system of “paying for access” is
often referred to as an “old boys club,” which thrives on insider privilege
and exclusivity. 120 Consequently, the solicitation ban made it difficult for
such funds to raise sufficient capital to access an accredited investor
audience.
A recent study conducted by PerTrac, an organization that provides
innumerable services to investment professionals, revealed that returns
have historically been higher for these emerging funds. 121 This study found
that between 1996 and 2011, funds with less than $100 million in assets
returned 12.5 percent annually, while funds with over $500 million in

117. WHISH, supra note 100, at 4.
118. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, HEDGE FUND MARKETING: UNDERSTANDING THE
JOBS ACT, 7 (2012), thehfa.org/articlePDFs/JOBSact.pdf (stating that “[a]ll four panelists
agreed that the JOBS Act will have the greatest effect on emerging managers, including
both small and midsize managers looking for increased exposure and AUM, as well as startups.”); Hedge Fund Ass’n, supra note 12; Small and Large Hedge Fund Managers View
JOBS Act Through Different Lens, HEDGE FUND MARKETING ALLIANCE, (July 11, 2012),
http://www.hedgefundmarketing.org/small-and-large-hedge-fund-managers-view-jobs-actthrough-different-lens (concluding that “emerging managers would be more enticed to cast
their lot and enter the industry” as result of the new solicitation rules).
119. Amit Chokshi, Hedge Fund Marketing’s Gray Area, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 1,
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/185671-hedge-fund-marketings-gray-area; Lyon,
supra note 88 (quoting Peter Turchan, Partner at Ready to Run Designs, who said “I think
that the recent lift will not cause drastic change to the industry or greatly effect [sic]
investors, but will [allow] lesser known funds to compete on a larger scale and reach a
larger audience of potential investors.”).
120. Tom Dworzanski, Comment Letter Regarding Section 201 of JOBS Act (June 7,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-23.pdf.
121. PERTRAC, IMPACT OF FUND SIZE AND AGE ON HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE, 4 (2011),
http://www.nasp-ny.org/files/pdf/PerTrac-Impact-of-Fund-Size.pdf [hereinafter PERTRAC]
(finding that “[s]mall funds outperformed mid-size and large funds in 2010, returning
13.04%, 11.14%, and 10.99%, respectively”) .
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assets returned 9.2 percent annually. 122 Analysts have suggested that this
performance gap exists because these new managers are often introducing
innovative and novel strategies in an effort to guarantee a performance fee
for management. 123 Hedge funds typically charge both a performance fee
(approximately 20 percent of profits) and a management fee
(approximately 2 percent of net assets), but larger funds that manage a
large volume of assets can depend solely on the management fee for
profits, whereas smaller funds must actually earn a profit in order to
generate sizable income. These larger, more-established funds may also be
more hesitant to take on innovative risks as they are often subject to
constraints imposed by a growing population of institutional investors, such
as pension plans and insurance companies. 124 These investors may demand
a more risk-averse strategy in order to safeguard their investment. 125 To the
extent that restricting marketing activities could promote the flow of
productive assets to newer and more innovative funds, lifting this ban could
promote healthy competition within the industry.
Such investors may also benefit from having this increased access to a
larger range of hedge funds. As previously stated in Part I above, these
vehicles enjoy greater flexibilities to guarantee absolute returns through
derivatives trading and unrestrained leverage, which are minimally
available to their mutual fund counterparts. The reliance on unverified
media reports or other forms of unreliable data can be problematic as these
sources often create an unfairly negative depiction of these vehicles,
especially since it has proven difficult for advisers to promote their
products in any public medium.
C. Higher Quality Funds
A number of prominent hedge funds have been implicated in widely
publicized scandals such as the Long-Term Capital Management
debacle, 126 the massive Amaranth failure, 127 and, most recently, the Bear
122. Stan Luxenberg, Good Hedge Funds Come in Small Packages, WEALTH
MANAGEMENT.COM
(May
14,
2013),
http://wealthmanagement.com/alternativeinvestments/good-hedge-funds-come-small-packages.
123. Id.
124. Katherine Burton, Soros Says Hedge Funds Can’t Beat Market Because of Fees,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-25/sorossays-hedge-funds-can-t-beat-market-because-of-fees.html.
125. Id.
126. See generally, ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001) (providing a detailed account of the near failure
of Long-Term-Capital Management, which likely imploded because of its excessive
leverage—its leverage exceeded $100 billion, although it only had about $1.8 billion in
assets).
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Stearns fiasco, where “the funds, [which were] filled with some of the most
explosive and high-risk securities available, imploded, evaporating $1.6
billion of investor assets . . . .” 128 While these funds were undoubtedly
engaged in extremely risky investment schemes that exposed their
investors, as well as the economy, to egregious financial losses, the hedge
fund industry, taken as a whole, encompasses an extremely heterogeneous
class of vehicles. These entities employ several different categories of
investment strategies and management styles, some of which may or may
not entail high-risk investments. The term “hedge” refers to funds’ historic
practice of using various strategies in order to hedge, or protect, their
portfolios against market losses. 129 For example, an investment adviser
could simultaneously take long and short positions in the same type of
instrument in order to ensure a return in both high and low markets. 130 This
was essentially how Alfred Winslow Jones structured the first hedge fund
in 1949. 131 He used short sales and leverage to create returns that had a low
correlation to general market performance. 132 Today, however, a multitude
of hedge fund strategies exist, some of which may or may not hedge their
investments and/or maintain excessive leverage. 133
Given this vast array of hedge fund strategies and management styles,
advertising can be a useful tool for these vehicles to effectively distinguish
themselves from the pack. Moreover, this new opportunity for hedge funds
to engage in healthy competition could give “high-value” advisers the tools
to successfully promote their brands to a wider audience. 134 As Professor
Allen Ferrell of Harvard Law School recently stated, “[h]igh-value firms
will be more likely to raise external finance if improved disclosure of firmspecific information is available at the time the firm is raising capital, given
the increased ability of the market to differentiate between high-value and
low-value firms.” 135 Marketing tools could make it easier for hedge funds
to publicly disclose distinguishable characteristics about their strategies,
127. Kristen French, Will Amaranth Debacle Curb Enthusiasm for Hedge Funds of
Funds?, WEALTH MANAGEMENT (Sept. 20, 2006), http://wealthmanagement.com/news/willamaranth-debacle-curb-enthusiasm-hedge-funds-funds (reporting that Amaranth Advisors
lost $3 billion of investment assets “due to wrong bets on natural gas prices”).
128. Landon Thomas, Jr., Prosecutors Build Bear Stearns Case on E-Mails, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20bear.html?_r=0.
129. JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS 15 (2005).
130. Id. at 14–15.
131. FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2006).
132. Id.
GROUP
LLC
,
133. What
is
a
Hedge
Fund?,
HENNESEE
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/hedgefund/index.html.
134. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 118, at 9.
135. Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around
the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 93 (2007).
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such as their leverage practices, diversification requirements, liquidity,
volatility, and other financial attributes. Advertising can also make it easier
for such advisers to distinguish their specific disclosure practices as well as
their unique approaches in managing operational risk, which “include
organizational aspects such as the reliability of back-office operations,
legal infrastructure, accounting and trade reconciliation, personnel issues,
and the day-to-day management of the business.” 136 Highlighting strengths
regarding the management of operational risk is a great way for advisers to
distinguish themselves as “high value” investments, given that most hedge
fund failures have resulted from operational inefficiencies. 137
This increased competition could eventually discourage “low-value”
funds from entering the industry, thereby improving the overall quality of
hedge fund products. Since this new advertising power will help investors
more easily identify industry norms in terms of leverage management,
operational risk, and other key attributes, they would presumably be less
likely to allocate capital to funds that have not engaged in similar practices.
To the extent that it becomes an industry norm to make ongoing disclosures
to investors regarding trading positions, ongoing risk management, and
material changes to personnel and/or infrastructure, investors may start
demanding comparable disclosures from all prospective funds. In effect,
competing funds may have a greater incentive to comply with these
emerging “high-value” standards.
This resulting competition can also lead to lower fees charged to
investors. 138 As background, these fees can include both the management
and performance fees paid to the primary investment adviser (briefly
described above), as well as any additional service provider payments,
which can include fees charged by auditors, lawyers, brokerage firms,
placement agents, and administrators. For hedge funds that operate as
fund-of-funds, where such advisers select a range of underlying funds for
investment as opposed to allocating to its own distinct investments,
additional fees are charged for investigating and monitoring the fund’s
underlying funds, and a percentage of the underlying funds’ fees is also
passed down to investors. Furthermore, allowing funds to undertake their
own advertising efforts could reduce the sales charges paid to placement

136. Andrew W. Lo, Risk Management for Hedge Funds: Introduction and Overview,
ANALYST
J.
16,
31
(2001),
57
FIN.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283308.
137. See Gareth Jones, Operational Due Diligence: Increased Demands for Hedge
Fund Managers and Investors, THE HEDGE FUND J. (June 9, 2010),
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/node/6559 (“Hedge fund managers who build a robust
business infrastructure will suffer fewer errors and less disruption.”).
138. Orol, supra note 113.
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agents. 139 As discussed in Part I.A, placement agents are typically hired to
help sell fund interests to prospective investors. 140 To the extent that hedge
funds are able to efficiently lower their underlying fees and publicly
advertise such practices, this would presumably induce competitors to
engage in comparable “fee reduction” activities. 141 One source has found
that increased competition among smaller funds is already leading to an
overall decrease in fees charged to hedge fund investors. 142 This will likely
continue as the solicitation ban makes it easier for smaller funds to access
private markets.
Competition has similarly helped to reduce overall fees charged to
investors in the heavily-regulated mutual fund industry. Since mutual
funds are public companies registered under the federal securities laws,
they have historically held the power to advertise in any broad-based
medium. As a result, a recent study found that the mutual fund industry is
extremely competitive, which makes investors “quite sensitive to the fees
that they pay.” 143 This phenomenon has gained recent attention with the
advent of exchange traded funds, which are a class of investment
companies that bundle securities that are listed under a particular index. 144
As one source noted:
“the so-called fee war in the exchange traded fund space has
helped slash annual investment costs on a number of fund
products, and it looks like it is paying off for both providers and
investors. Last September, Charles Schwab reduced its fees on a
number of funds . . . to 0.04%, the lowest on the market, from the
original 0.06% expense ratio . . . .” 145
139. Ryan C. Fuhrmann, Hedge Fund Fees: Exotic Expenses, INVESTOPEDIA (July 10,
2013),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071013/hedge-fund-fees-exoticexpenses.asp.
140. Id.
141. Lyon, supra note 88.
142. Hedge Fund Fees Fall, FINALTERNATIVES (Sept. 9, 2013, 11:24 AM),
www.finalternatives.com/node/24644.
143. Ben Baden, Why The Mutual Fund Industry Is Highly Competitive, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Apr. 9, 2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/FundObserver/2010/04/09/why-the-mutual-fund-industry-is-highly-competitive; see generally,
R. GLENN HUBBARD ET AL., THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: COMPETITION AND INVESTOR
WELFARE (2010) (outlining the processes by which the courts determine whether or not
mutual fund fees are excessive).
144. Definition
of
ETF,
INVESTORWORDS.COM,
http://www.investorwords.com/1755/ETF.html.
145. Tom Lydon, ETF Fees: Competition is a Good Thing, ETF TRENDS (June 18, 2013,
4:30 PM), http://www.etftrends.com/2013/06/etf-fees-competition-is-a-good-thing; see also,
Aaron Levitt, How the ETF Fee War Benefits Investors, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/2013/how-the-etf-fee-war-benefits-investorsspy-voo-xle-schb0214.aspx (demonstrating how firms are competing by lowering ETF
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Thus, competition within the mutual fund industry has led to the
creation of innovative products that have effectively lowered overall fees
charged to investors.
III. FRAUD
Part III explains how the removal of the solicitation ban can actually
deter fraud in certain respects. It first illustrates how the increase in
competition will make it more difficult for fraudulent advisers to solicit
prospective investors. Part III continues by identifying portions of the
newly adopted Rule 506(c) that serve to deter fraudulent investors from
utilizing false advertisements. This part concludes with a brief summary of
the various frameworks provided under federal securities laws, particularly
the Advisers Act, which directly regulates investor communications. These
existing frameworks will serve as yet another mechanism to effectively
prevent fraudulent advisers from using false advertising to induce
unsuspecting investors.
A. Advertising Can Push Out Bad Actors
The resulting increase in competition will probably make it more
difficult for fraudulent advisers to rival their non-fraudulent counterparts.
Since increased competition can help to optimize investor choice, foster
innovation, and promote higher quality products, “bad-actors” may find it
more difficult to attract prospective investors. Even still, advertising
carries a latent risk that investors will be induced to invest in fraudulent
investment schemes. 146 Investors may simply flock to hedge funds that
have earned high returns without considering other key attributes like risk
management, leverage activities, and long-term investment goals, all of
which are frequently disregarded by fraudulent advisers. This concern is
legitimate, especially since the North American Securities Administrators
Association found that Rule 506 offerings led to the highest number of
state administered enforcement actions in 2011. 147
investment fees for their products); Brendan Conway, Will BlackRock Cut ETF Fees?,
(Sept.
8,
2012),
BARRON’S
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111904294104577631472724967672.html
.
146. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
147. N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., Comment Letter Relating to Section 201 of JOBS
Act (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NASAA-CommentLetter-to-SEC-re-Rule-506.pdf; Laws Provide Con Artists with Personal Economic Growth
Plan, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, INC. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.nasaa.org/14679/lawsprovide-con-artists-with-personal-economic-growth-plan.
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While fraudulent advisers may be tempted to use advertisements to
attract prospective investors, this new power to advertise can actually serve
to deter fraud in certain respects. Given the increased scrutiny that will
result from this new freedom to advertise, it may be more difficult for
fraudulent funds to fly under the radar. As one source noted:
“the new rules are going to entice hedge funds to share more
information, and in some cases, lure money managers into the
public eye. And once you’ve gone on the air and shown the
world what a brilliant and disciplined character you are, it’s a
little bit harder to engage in [fraudulent activities].” 148
Essentially, once a hedge fund makes communications in a public
forum, it may thereafter be subjected to increased scrutiny from existing
and prospective investors, as well as state and national regulators.
Similarly, enhanced marketing activities could remove the historical
reliance on trusted referrals for a certain subset of hedge fund investors.
Commentators have found that this reliance on referrals, as well as the
general availability of the private placement exemptions, assisted in the
perpetuation of the Madoff scandal and other comparable Ponzi schemes. 149
With respect to the Madoff scandal, “[r]elatively few third-party entities
had access to performance statistics and operational information” about the
underlying advisory business of his firm. 150 If such information were
publicly available to a broader audience, this notorious Ponzi scheme could
have been identified at an earlier stage. By and large, the secrecy that
resulted from the solicitation ban created opportunities for private advisers
to take advantage of prospective investors. 151
Regulators still must consistently monitor the extent to which
advertising disclosures dupe investors into investing in fraudulent schemes.
The SEC has various tools at its disposal to combat these disclsoures under
148. Patrick Clark, Let the Hedge Funds Speak! Why New Rules on Marketing May Be
OBSERVER
(Sept.
10,
2012,
3:16
PM),
a
Good
Thing,
N.Y.
http://observer.com/2012/09/how-hedge-fund-marketing-rules-could-root-out-bad-actorsreally.
149. The Madoff Investment Securities Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and
the Need for Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia
University
Law
School),
available
at
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/professor-coffee-testimony-at-senate-madoffhearing.html; Orol, supra note 113.
150. Stephen Brown et al., Trust and Delegation 1 (May 16, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with New York University Stern School of Business), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456414.
151. Daniel Strachman, Hedge Funds: It’s Still Caveat Broker. Their Mystique Lures
Clients, but the Dearth of Information Can Be Dangerous, ON WALL ST. (July 1, 2003),
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-104549302.html.
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the new Rule 506(c), as well as the Advisers Act. The effectiveness of
these regulatory frameworks will be further discussed in Parts III.B and
III.C, below.
B. Amendments to Rule 506 Deter Fraud
The final rule provided under 506(c) incorporates provisions that
would partially prevent and/or deter fraudulent investment schemes. First,
in order for issuers to take advantage of this new power to advertise, they
must take “reasonable steps to verify” that prospective investors actually
qualify as accredited. 152 This heightened standard is designed to prevent
retail investors from inadvertently investing in these private funds since,
theoretically, such investors cannot adequately fend for themselves. 153
Knowingly accepting such investors into private hedge fund vehicles would
constitute a fraudulent investment scheme under the federal securities laws.
Previously, hedge funds were not required to make additional inquiries into
the actual status of its investors, beyond the “check-the-box” representation
signed by investors on their subscription agreements.
Under the new Rule 506(c), the SEC maintains a flexible standard for
determining whether new verification requirements are legitimate, which
will depend on the facts and circumstances related to the “nature of the
purchaser, the amount and type of information the purchaser has about the
issuer, and the nature of the offering (including the manner in which the
purchaser was solicited).” 154 However, the SEC provides a non-exclusive
list of safe harbors that would meet this heightened requirement. 155 For
example, “in verifying whether a natural person is an accredited investor on
the basis of income, an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification
requirement in Rule 506(c) by reviewing copies of any [IRS] form . . . .” 156
In addition,
“an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in
Rule 506(c) by obtaining a written confirmation from a registered
broker-dealer, an SEC-registered investment adviser, a licensed
attorney, or a certified public accountant that such person or
entity has taken reasonable steps to verify that the purchaser is an

152. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act
Release
No.
69,959
(July
10,
2013),
at
19,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf [hereinafter, Final Rule 506 Release].
153. Id.
154. Heller, supra note 91.
155. Final Rule 506 Release, supra note 152, at 27–28.
156. Id. at 36.
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accredited investor . . . .” 157
Second, the SEC adopted a revision to Form D, which is a required
public filing for private companies relying on the Rule 504, 505 or 506
exemptions provided under Regulation D. 158 The general purpose of this
form is to notify the SEC, as well as the general public, that an issuer is
engaged in a private offering. It must be filed “no later than 15 calendar
days after the ‘date of first sale’ of securities.” 159 Under the final
amendment, issuers who choose to advertise must indicate that they are
relying on the accompanying 506(c) exemption on their respective Form D
filings. As such, the SEC can use this notification mechanism to scrutinize
the communications made by private issuers. This could provide a useful
tool to monitor communications that would otherwise be used to dupe
investors into investing in fraudulent schemes. In addition, this notification
requirement could deter fraudulent advisers from using advertisements to
effectuate their schemes, as they would presumably be reluctant to provide
the SEC with such constructive notification.
Furthermore, Rule 506 was recently amended to reflect the mandated
disqualification of “bad-actors” pursuant to Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “DoddFrank Act”). 160 This newly incorporated “bad-actor” provision serves to
“disqualify securities offerings from reliance on [Rule 506] if the issuer or
other relevant persons (such as underwriters, placement agents and the
directors, officers and significant shareholders of the issuer) have been
convicted of, or are subject to court or administrative sanctions for,
securities fraud or other violations of specified laws.” 161 Thus, if a
particular “disqualifying event” occurs with respect to any “covered
person” related to the offering in question, then the issuer will lose its Rule
506 exemption. 162 This new provision serves as a major deterrent against
fraud, as advisers who are convicted of securities fraud (along with any
covered persons) are automatically disqualified from relying on the Rule
506 exemption.

157. Id. at 38.
158. Form D: Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, SEC.GOV,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9414 (July 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/339414.pdf [hereinafter, Final Bad Actor Release].
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id.
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C. Advisers Act Constraints Deter Fraud
The SEC refrained from imposing additional restrictions on the
content and form of general solicitations because the Advisers Act already
imposes significant restrictions on investor communications. In its
adopting release, the SEC stated:
“[w]e believe that investment advisers that have implemented
appropriate policies and procedures regarding, among other
things, the nature and content of private fund sales literature [as
required under the Advisers Act], including general solicitation
materials, are less likely to use materials that materially mislead
investors or otherwise violate the federal securities laws.” 163
Several other commentators agree that the existing restrictions placed
on both registered and unregistered advisers will sufficiently derail
fraudulent advertisements. 164
The general anti-fraud provisions provided under the federal securities
laws apply to all advisers, even if they are exempt from registration. Under
Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, exempt advisers
cannot utilize “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . .” in
any disclosures provided to investors. 165 Similarly, under Section 206 of
the Advisers Act, advisers are prohibited from using any fraudulent
“device, scheme or artifice” to defraud clients, which largely restricts the
extent to which advisers can use public disclosures to induce investors into
fraudulent schemes. 166 It is easier for investors to assert Section 206
actions, as opposed to Rule 10b-5 actions, because scienter is not always a
required element in proving such violations. 167 Proving scienter can be a
difficult hurdle for investors to overcome, as it requires investors to prove
that advisers acted with some degree of intent in engaging in the alleged
fraudulent practice. Since this scienter requirement is often an excluded
element, investors, as well as the SEC, generally have more freedom to

163. Final Rule 506 Release, supra note 152, at 53.
164. See e.g., Press Release, Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, AIMA Supports Removal of Ban on
General Solicitation and Advertising by US Hedge Fund Managers (July 12, 2012),
http://aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/F340E5F1-85D6-4A20998CC41AC04E2A96 (“AIMA CEO Andrew Baker said: ‘With the advent of greater
regulation, transparency and oversight of the hedge fund industry, we believe that the time
has come to bring the general solicitation and advertising regulations in the US more in line
with what we see as more flexible marketing and advertising regimes adopted elsewhere in
the world.’”); BlackRock Letter, supra note 12, at 2.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
167. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, §3:22.
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pursue Section 206 actions. Recent examples of Section 206 violations
include “overstating performance results” and “[f]ailing to disclose in
investor communications that a large portion of the fund’s superior
performance was due to investments in initial public offerings that are
unlikely to have the same impact as the fund grows . . . .” 168
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, 169 many hedge fund advisers
are now required to register under the Advisers Act. More specifically,
private advisers who manage $150 million or more in assets must register
under the Advisers Act. 170 This new registration requirement imposes
certain disclosure requirements, such as descriptions of the advisory
services offered, material conflicts of interest, any pending disciplinary
actions, advisory fees charged, and other general business descriptions. 171
It also subjects advisers to additional fiduciary obligations, certain
recordkeeping requirements, as well as various restrictions on the manner
in which communications are presented to investors. 172 These restrictions
on communications will also apply to the content and form of any general
solicitations utilized by hedge fund advisers. Generally speaking, the SEC
actively monitors investment adviser communications and “regularly
imposes significant sanctions when it finds what it believes are misleading
or inappropriate advertising practices . . . .” 173
While this Article is not intended to give a comprehensive overview of
the various ways in which the Advisers Act restricts advertising, it does
provide key examples of how these restrictions can serve to continuously
deter fraud. For instance, investor testimonials that endorse or promote any
particular adviser are broadly restricted from being referenced in any
distributed advertisement. 174 This restriction is designed to prevent
investors from believing that all prior or existing investors have
experienced the same positive results, and it similarly prevents investors
from ignoring potentially unfavorable attributes of a particular
investment. 175
With respect to the numerous restrictions placed on the presentation of
performance, all such presentations must be presented fairly. 176 Under this

168. Id.
169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd-Frank Act”].
170. Dodd-Frank Act § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3(b)).
171. 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-4.
172. Id.
173. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, §3:38.
174. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (2013).
175. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, §3:35.
176. Allied Invs. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14627 (May 24, 1979) (holding
that the “Brochure Rule” does not require disclosure of performance information to clients,
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broad standard, the SEC has published several no-action letters and
instituted various enforcement actions, each of which provides additional
guidance on determining whether a particular performance presentation is
inherently unfair. The leading guidance is provided in a no-action letter
that was issued to Clover Capital Management, Inc. in 1986 (the “Clover
Letter”). 177 The Clover Letter places multiple conditions and requirements
on the presentation of model performance, which are essentially
performance figures that are derived from hypothetical portfolios.
Advisers who choose to advertise model performance must prominently
disclose the general limitations of evaluating hypothetical portfolios, as
well as any other material attributes and/or limitations associated with the
presentation. 178
With respect to the presentation of actual performance, the Clover
Letter requires that advisers make multiple accompanying disclosures,
some of which include the potential effects of market conditions, whether
the results reflect reinvestment of earnings, and “any material conditions,
objectives, or investment strategies used to obtain the results portrayed.” 179
Actual performance must also incorporate deductions for any and all fees
passed down to investors, which can include advisory fees, brokerage
commissions, and other expenses incurred by the fund. 180 In addition, Rule
206(4)-1 places certain limitations on selecting profitable portfolios for a
presentation, particularly when the adviser simultaneously advised
unprofitable portfolios. 181
On the whole, the Advisers Act has several existing frameworks that
will continue to deter advisers from inducing investors with fraudulent
communications.
The various restrictions placed on performance
presentations help to ensure that investors are not relying on fraudulently
derived results. However, there are certain loopholes with respect to hedge
fund valuation practices, as well as a certain subset of smaller funds, that
are not specifically addressed by the Advisers Act or the newly adopted
JOBS Act. These loopholes are further discussed in Part IV.A below.
IV. FUTURE REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Although the removal of the solicitation ban can improve investor

but such information could be included in presentations).
177. Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67379 (Oct. 28,
1986).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 17 C.F.R § 275.206(4)-1 (2013).
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protection by expanding transparency, enhancing competition, and
deterring fraud, future regulatory challenges still remain. These challenges
include the inherent conflicts of interest and the lack of standardization
with respect to hedge fund valuations, the fraud loophole created by
smaller funds that escape oversight under the Advisers Act, and the
potential increase in speculation that could significantly compromise
investor confidence. Part IV begins by highlighting how the lack of
standardized valuation practices will create unique challenges with respect
to the evaluation of advertised performance results. It continues by
identifying the existing conflicts of interest that create incentives for
advisers to misreport valuations. Part IV then suggests possible solutions
to these valuations challenges, some of which include third-party oversight
and/or standardized methodologies for particular hedge fund investments.
Part IV continues by identifying a key fraud loophole with respect to
smaller funds that escape federal oversight under the Advisers Act. Such
funds are frequently more susceptible to fraud than their larger
counterparts. Thus, requiring Advisers Act registration for all advisers who
utilize general solicitations may be the most viable solution. Part IV then
explains how the continuous growth of the industry, which will likely be
expedited with the removal of the solicitation ban, could increase
speculative trading activities, potentially compromising investor
confidence. Part IV concludes with a suggestion that the SEC and/or
Congress mandate a study of the resulting speculation’s effect on the
markets, to be completed within two years after the passage of the JOBS
Act.
A. Valuation Challenges
Numerous commentators, researchers and regulatory bodies have
identified the valuation of hedge fund portfolios as one of the most
Valuation
prominent challenges facing prospective investors. 182
mechanisms are central to hedge fund performance because such practices

182. See e.g., SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 64; Houman B. Shadab, Hedge
Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2013) (observing that hedge fund
governance suffers significant deficiencies in the reporting of valuations); Wulf A. Kaal,
Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 584 (2009) (arguing that “[w]ith the lack of regulatory oversight in
most jurisdictions, as well as the general lack of self-discipline and internal controls,
valuation is very likely to become the next major issue for the hedge fund industry.”); Mara
Der Hovanesian, The SEC Isn’t Finished with Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
July 16, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993055.htm
(discussing the challenges of implementing subjective valuation procedures for illiquid
assets traded by hedge funds).
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are directly linked to net asset value calculations, performance fees paid to
managers and other service providers, performance and financial reports
distributed to investors, and collateral required by hedge fund
The challenges that arise with respect to these
counterparties. 183
mechanisms generally fall within two distinct categories. The first
category involves traded assets that are extremely difficult to value, which
creates difficulties regarding standardization.
The second category
encompasses inherent conflicts of interest that expose hedge fund investors
to an increased risk of fraudulent valuation reports, which is an additional
loophole that is not sufficiently addressed under the JOBS Act, or any other
recent regulatory action.
1. Lack of Standardization
Since hedge funds are not required to adhere to standardized valuation
mechanisms for the wide range of instruments traded within the industry, it
can be difficult for investors to assess the true nature of a particular fund’s
value. 184 Furthermore, this lack of standardization can make it difficult for
investors to appropriately evaluate a potential hedge fund investment in
relation to other comparable funds. 185 While the new power to advertise
can result in greater comparability among hedge funds, as briefly discussed
in Part III.A above, this benefit cannot fully be realized unless there is an
accompanying standardized format for calculating valuations and
performance data.
For example, two different advertisements for competing hedge fund
products, each trading the same illiquid securities, could equally promote
an annual return of 10%. However, each hedge fund adviser is free to use
separate valuation mechanisms to derive the fund’s value, and the financial
statements that are provided by such hedge funds are not required to
comply with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) or be
reviewed by a CPA. 186 An investment adviser may therefore select the

183. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR THE VALUATION OF HEDGE FUND
PORTFOLIOS, 7 (2007), http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20070425/02.pdf [hereinafter
Valuation Report].
184. See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A
Proposal to Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 87, 120–124 (discussing the adverse effects resulting from the lack of
standardization in the hedge fund industry).
185. See id. at 116–120 (discussing the inherent difficulties in comparing a large range
of hedge fund investments).
186. Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market
Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 1, 29 (2007).
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most favorable valuation principle without running afoul of the antifraud
provisions provided under the federal securities laws. Investment advisers
are thereby placed in the precarious position of having minimal economic
incentives to choose the most accurate valuation mechanism. This is also
problematic to the extent that “high-value” advisers are precluded from
legitimately bolstering their brands by “low-value” advisers, who are
effectively permitted to manipulate their funds’ overall worth through this
lack of standardization. As SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar stated, “if
information is lacking, unreliable, or difficult to compare, investors will
tend to ‘overpay’ for low-quality securities and ‘underpay’ for high-quality
ones.” 187
Although some hedge funds trade instruments that are relatively easy
to price, such as securities with readily available market quotations, others
trade in a variety of illiquid and/or complex instruments that are
exceedingly difficult to value. Certain kinds of distressed securities, overthe-counter structured notes, and other kinds of illiquid instruments traded
by funds are not accompanied by reliable market information on their
actual values. 188 With respect to collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”),
which are investment vehicles that offer securitized interests in a pool of
loan or debt instruments, a computer program could take days to value such
instruments. 189 The mathematical models utilized by these computer
programs often rely on “assumptions and forecasts that are subjective and
open to question.” 190 Similarly, collateralized mortgage obligations, which
are investment vehicles that offer securitized interests in a pool of
mortgages, are so complex that counterparties within a CMO transaction
could yield different values for the same CMO interest. 191 Convertible
bonds also present similar valuation difficulties as:
“[they] can be extremely complex to value and have limited
187. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Capital Formation from the
Investor’s Perspective, Address at the American Institute of CPA’s Conference (Dec. 3,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491900#.U4Oc4vldWSo.
188. Valuation Report, supra note 183, at 8.
189. Jennifer S. Taub, Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that
Facilitated the Global Financial Crisis 2 (Univ. of Vt. Working Paper Series, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1472190; Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm (last visited May
26, 2014).
190. Christopher Kundro & Stuart Feffer, Valuation Issues and Operational Risk in
J.
FIN.
TRANSFORMATION
41,
42
(2004),
Hedge
Funds,
10
http://www.hedgefundprofiler.com/Documents/48.pdf.
191. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH
ROLLERS AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 42 (2008) (“These were exotic instruments that
were almost never traded, so the prices were set by models, but Askin’s and the banks’
models produced different results.”).
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liquidity. Broker quotes for convertibles can vary significantly
for the same issue, and it can be difficult to determine the size for
which any given quote is good. (In one convertible portfolio we
recently studied, for example, the average difference between
highest and lowest bid on the same issue was around 5%, with the
largest deltas as high as 20%).” 192
Moreover, “[n]ew types of complex swaps, options, and hybrids are
being developed constantly, and some hedge funds will make use of highly
customized instruments in their portfolios.” 193 Given the wide variety of
instruments traded by hedge funds, the industry would greatly benefit from
the implementation of standardized methodologies.
2. Conflicts of Interest
By and large, hedge fund managers often possess exclusive control
over the valuation mechanisms utilized by their respective funds, which
creates unique conflicts of interest between themselves and their underlying
investors. 194 Hedge fund advisers predominantly design, implement and
monitor the valuation processes of their own managed portfolios. 195 Even
for funds that hire third-party service providers or administrators to
separately calculate valuations, most advisers retain full discretion to
deviate from any provided final figures. 196 Since advisers are compensated
based on the actual performance of the fund (which of course is derived
from how its assets are valued), hedge fund managers have a conflict of
interest in maintaining legitimate/fair mechanisms for investors, while
ensuring the highest return possible for themselves. 197
Similarly, several empirical studies have proven that hedge fund
advisers are, to a large extent, falsifying returns to earn higher fees and
improve the reputation of their respective funds. A recent study
investigated whether hedge fund advisers were significantly misreporting
the value of their equity positions as recorded on Form 13F, which must be
completed by all hedge funds that manage an aggregate fair market value
of $100,000,000 of publicly-traded equity securities. 198 This study found
192. Kundro, supra note 190, at 44.
193. Id. at 45.
194. Valuation Report, supra note 183, at 10.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Wulf, supra note 182, at 587–591 (providing an in-depth discussion of the various
conflicts of interest related to both the payment of adviser fees and the calculation of
valuations).
198. Form 13F: Information Required of Institutional Investment Managers Pursuant to
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules Thereunder, SEC.GOV,
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that about seven percent (150,000 positions) of all reported equity positions
held by hedge funds differed from the final closing price of such equities,
even though the SEC requests that the provided value of such equities be
consistent with their closing prices. 199 An additional study found that a
large percentage of hedge funds advisers intentionally inflate December
returns so as to earn a higher incentive fees and make the fund appear more
attractive for potential investors. 200 In a similar vein, a different study
analyzed a database of due diligence reports provided by hedge funds to
prospective investors. 201 Within this subset of reports:
“[1] [A]bout 18% of funds’ asset information either could not be
verified independently . . . or disagreed with evidence from an
alternative
source . . . .[;]
[2] . . .
performance
related
discrepancies . . . or verification problems . . . were noted for
14% of [due diligence] investigations [; and] [3] . . . 21% of
managers . . .
interviewed
verbally
stated
incorrect
information . . . when checked against written documentation,
including poor recollection about basic levels of assets and
performance. For example, one manager’s verbal assets under
management figure was over $300 million higher than the actual
number.” 202
In effect, this study found that despite the expensive and tedious due
diligence processes implemented by many hedge fund investors, the
provision of inaccurate disclosures is not an uncommon practice. 203
Researchers have also found that many hedge fund advisers are
intentionally smoothing returns so that their funds appear less volatile. 204
One such study found that this practice of intentional smoothing was far
more prevalent in hedge funds that trade illiquid securities, as well as in
funds where the adviser is given wide discretion to control valuations. 205
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form13f.pdf.
199. Gjergji Cici, et al., The Valuation of Hedge Funds’ Equity Positions (American
Finance Association 2012 Chicago Meetings Working Paper, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664461.
200. Vikas Agarwal, et al., Do Hedge Funds Manage Their Reported Returns?, 24 REV.
FIN.
STUD.
3281
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891169.
201. Brown, supra note 150, at 12.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 24.
204. Olivier Le Marois & Riskdata, Return Smoothing Practices: A Potential Threat for
Alternative
Investment
Growth,
RISKDATA,
http://www.riskdata.com/files/resources/Hedge%20Funds/Riskdata%20Article%20on%20R
eturn%20Smoothing.pdf.
205. Gavin Cassar & Joseph Gerakos, Hedge Funds: Pricing Controls and the
Smoothing of Self-Reported Returns 1 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
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As stated by the authors of this article, “[t]he question is of economic
importance because intentional smoothing can reduce the observed
volatility of returns, thereby distorting commonly used risk adjusted
performance measures such as Sharpe ratios and market betas.” 206 This
process of smoothing allows funds to further conceal risks, which
complicates the process of sufficiently aggregating valuation profiles.
Valuation discrepancies have also led to significant losses for hedge
fund investors. Beacon Hill Asset Management LLC (“Beacon Hill”), a
hedge fund adviser based in Summit, New Jersey, was charged with
fraudulent valuation representations that led to over $300 million of losses
for its investors. 207 The SEC alleged that Beacon Hill manipulated its
valuation procedures to disclose steady growth, while hiding significant
losses by inflating the prices of securities held by one of its funds. 208 This
maintained the appearance of positive returns, even though the fund was
actually decreasing in value. 209 Similarly, Lipper & Co. (“Lipper”), an
investment management firm based in New York, liquidated three of its
funds after realizing previously undisclosed declines in market value,
which contributed to losses exceeding $315 million. 210 According to this
firm, the losses resulted from the mispricing of the convertible-bonds,
which are often illiquid and difficult to value. 211 Lipper had previously
disclosed to investors that that the domestic fund experienced a 7%
increase in profits, when it had actually suffered a decline of about 45%. 212
3. Possible Valuation Solutions
While it is difficult to create uniform valuation mechanisms for all
hedge fund investments, since the strategies employed by hedge funds are
heterogeneous and distinct from traditional investments, it is vital that
certain standards are developed and applied consistently. This can perhaps
be achieved by requiring third-party oversight for valuation procedures, so
as to remove the existing conflicts of interest that currently incent certain
advisers to report false performance results. In addition, creating separate

No. 09-43, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498601.
206. Id.
207. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, Litigation Release No. 18745A, 2004 WL 1575235
(June 16, 2004).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Allison Bisby Colter, Several Kenneth Lipper Hedge Funds Are Being Liquidated
ST.
J.,
March
29,
2002,
After
Big
Losses,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1017355983517177960.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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valuation procedures for different types of instruments or adopting the
models proposed by the Managed Funds Association, or other similar
organizations, could help to standardize performance figures. 213 This
would make it even easier for hedge fund investors to optimize their
investment decisions as the advertised performance figures could be more
easily compared across various opportunities. Any such requirements
should be mandated for all hedge funds that are registered under the
Advisers Act.
B. Smaller Funds Escape Advisers Act Registration
Studies have also found that smaller funds, which will likely be the
primary beneficiary of this new power to advertise, are much more likely to
commit fraud. 214 One proffered reason for this phenomenon is that larger
hedge funds attract a greater number of institutional investors, as opposed
to high net-worth individuals. 215 Institutions are far more likely to expend a
significant amount of resources performing extensive due diligence
This heightened due
investigations on prospective investments. 216
diligence process inevitably holds such advisers to a higher standard since
their business practices are more closely scrutinized. In effect, if a hedge
fund has a large number of institutional investors that are demanding more
disclosure and greater transparency, then such advisers are less likely to
participate in fraudulent investment activities. The removal of the
solicitation ban could lead to a proliferation of fraudulent funds among
emerging advisers, especially since they are much more likely to attract
wealthy individuals, as opposed to prominent institutions.
Furthermore, the reliance on advertising by this increasing pool of

213. See generally Martin, supra note 184, at 131–141 (identifying possible solutions
for developing standardized valuations).
214. See Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of
American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 372 (2008)
(explaining that many of the fraud actions pursued by the SEC have been against funds with
less than $25 million in assets, which are not required to register); Anuj Gangahar, SEC
Rule Ignores Highest-Risk Category of Fund Fraud, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2005),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2005-10-31/sec-rule-ignores-highest-risk-category-offund-fraud.
215. See Lewis, supra note 209, at 372 (commenting that registered hedge funds that
pension funds invest in are not the problem); Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds: A $25 Million
(Aug.
5,
2005,
2:20
PM),
Loophole,
CNNMONEY.COM
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/markets/hedge_regulation/index.htm.
216. See Netty Ismail, Institutions Damp Hedge Fund ‘Startup Spirit,’ Citi’s Roe Says,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-21/hedge-fundsstartups-slow-as-investors-demand-track-record-citigroup-says.html (discussing institutional
investors’ preference for large hedge funds).

MARTIN_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

ONE STEP FORWARD FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS

8/28/2014 2:43 PM

1183

wealthy individuals could create the presumption that the underlying
offering has been registered with the SEC. Such investors may assume that
due diligence is no longer required for prospective investments that have
been publicly marketed. Corgentum Consulting, a firm which specializes
in hedge fund due diligence, shared this similar concern in a report that
summarizes the potential impact of the JOBS Act. 217 This report concluded
that “[w]hen a broader, more aggressive marketing net is cast, smaller
investors will likely show interest. These smaller investors may not be
knowledgeable about fund operations or be equipped to perform
operational due diligence.” 218 Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that a
subset of prospective investors will rely solely on marketing materials
without performing adequate due diligence on the hedge fund in question.
This is particularly problematic since smaller funds dominate a sizable
portion of the industry. In fact, one study found that “[s]mall funds [funds
with less than $100 million under management], in 2010, comprised
71.39% of the hedge fund universe, mid-size funds 21.17%, and large
funds 7.44%.” 219 In addition, advisers with less than $150 million in assets
under management in the United States are not required to register under
the Advisers Act. 220 While the antifraud provisions will still apply to such
exempt funds, they will be excluded from the more stringent advertising
restrictions and disclosure obligations discussed in Part IV.C. This creates
a significant fraud loophole that could undermine the multiple benefits of
removing the solicitation ban discussed at length in this Article.
Requiring all private advisers choosing to advertise to register under
the Advisers Act could close this loophole. This would ensure that all
advisers who utilize general solicitations are providing comparable
disclosures to investors. Since many advisers are already registered under
the Advisers Act pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, implementing this
requirement for smaller advisers may prove to be the most cost-effective
means of deterring fraud.
C. Speculation
Speculation generally refers to the selection of investments based on
217. The JOBS Act Won’t Affect Due Diligence — Or at Least Shouldn’t . . .,
CORGENTUM (2012), http://corgentum.com/research/hedge-fund-operational-due-diligenceJOBS_Act.html.
218. Id.
219. PERTRAC, supra note 121, at 4.
220. The Dodd-Frank Act, § 408 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3 (2010)).
Advisers who manage less than $100 million of assets are subject to regulation by their
respective states. Id. §410. However, this is still problematic because it can result in the
production of inconsistent disclosures for a large number of hedge funds investors.
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anticipated price movements. 221 Many hedge fund advisers earn their
profits solely through the exploitation of price inefficiencies in the markets
and, as a result, are “one of the significant forces in speculative markets.” 222
According to a recent survey, hedge funds are also responsible for much of
the trading activity that implicates speculative strategies. These vehicles
collectively control nearly 30 percent of all U.S. fixed-income trading, 55
percent of derivatives trading in the U.S. with investment-grade ratings,
and 55 percent of the trading for emerging-market bonds. 223 This survey
also found that “[i]n some corners of the U.S. debt market, hedge funds
practically are the market. For instance, hedge funds generated more than
80% of the trading for derivatives with high-yield ratings, and more than
85% of volume in distressed debt.” 224 Arbitrage strategies are also used to
exploit price inefficiencies within certain debt, securities, or currency
instruments. 225 In some cases, hedge funds speculate on actual events that
may occur with respect to particular markets, enterprises, or transactions.
This can be effectuated through short-trading and other derivative
instruments. 226 These speculative trading activities help advisers to
guarantee positive returns irrespective of market conditions, which is often
the primary reason for investing in these vehicles. 227
While certain large trading positions in specific companies must be
disclosed by hedge funds pursuant to rules under the Exchange Act, 228
compliance with these rules does not sufficiently expose how the trading
activities of such vehicles contribute to speculation. Given the growing
complexities of these speculative trading strategies, which often combine a
variety of instruments (some not subject to regulation by the SEC) and
dynamic trading strategies to yield a positive return, the effectiveness of
221. Definition
of
Speculation,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/speculation.asp.
222. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market
Volatility — What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 913 (2005).
223. Craig Karmin, Hedge Funds Do About 30% of Bond Trading, Study Says, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at C3.
224. Id.
225. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, § 1.2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Advisers that own more than 5% of publicly-traded securities must publicly
disclose such acquisition. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a et seq., Rule 13d-1 (2006). Certain qualified
institutional buyers, which include many hedge fund advisers, can complete a short-form of
this disclosure. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a et seq., Rule 13g. In addition, advisers with “investment
discretion over $100 million or more of publicly traded equity securities [must] file
quarterly reports disclosing these holdings and the type of investment and voting authority
exercised by the manager.” LEMKE ET AL., supra note 76, § 7.3; 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a et seq.,
Rule 13f.
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such reporting rules need to be re-evaluated. 229 The SEC, as well as hedge
fund investors and other market participants, will need access to a
comprehensive view of the ongoing trading strategies utilized by such
vehicles to determine the net effect that such speculative activities have on
the capital markets.
For instance, numerous sources have investigated the extent to which
Magnetar, a massive Chicago-based hedge fund, exacerbated the housing
bubble through its speculative trading activities in complex, mortgagebacked securities. 230 In late 2005, just as the housing market was beginning
to deflate, Magnetar brokered deals with several banks to invest in the
riskiest portion of various CDOs. 231 Some estimates have found that
Magnetar controlled up to half of the total volume of these toxic
investments. 232 Apparently, unbeknownst to the counterparties involved,
the fund bet against its own trades by investing heavily into credit default
swaps, which function as insurance policies, which pay out if the CDO
eventually fails. 233 Magnetar helped guarantee that the CDOs would
ultimately fail by ensuring that the CDOs were comprised of only the
riskiest types of assets. 234 In effect, Magnetar helped to create the very
CDOs that it was betting against. When these CDOs did in fact fail,
Magnetar earned record returns, while their counterparties suffered
enormous losses. The SEC filed charges against one such counterparty,
JPMorgan Chase, for failing to tell investors that Magnetar helped to create
the CDOs that it was betting against by purchasing credit default swaps. 235
While Magnetar denies many of these allegations, and did not technically
break any laws in brokering these deals, more research is needed to
determine the extent to which these kinds of transactions harm the
economy — especially in light of the new power to advertise.

229. The Dodd-Frank Act does equip the SEC with power to collect additional
disclosures from both registered and exempt advisers. The Dodd-Frank Act § 404 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-4 (2010)). These disclosures are likely designed to help
the SEC identify whether certain hedge funds pose a systemic risk to the economy. Id.
However, the SEC has neither defined systemic risk nor explained how increased
speculation could be directly linked to an increase in it.
230. Stephen Gandel, Even Housing Bears Bought Big Homes Before the Crash,
CNNMONEY (Apr. 1, 2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/01/wall-street-housingbubble; Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund
(Apr.
9,
2010),
Helped
Keep
the
Bubble
Going,
PROPUBLICA
http://www.propublica.org/article/all-the-magnetar-trade-how-one-hedge-fund-helped-keepthe-housing-bubble.
231. Eisinger, supra note 230.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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In addition, the price volatility that results from speculation can
adversely affect investor confidence, as investors will be less likely to
invest in the capital markets if the prices do not fairly represent the intrinsic
value of the underlying assets. Although it is difficult to measure investor
confidence and, similarly, to measure and promote policies that would
improve investor confidence, many researchers in the securities regulation
realm agree that preserving investor confidence is essential to the efficient
functioning of the markets. A recent empirical study found that trusting
individuals are more likely to buy stocks. 236 In the sample analyzed by the
study, a propensity to trust in others increased the probability of buying
stock by 50 percent, which resulted in an increase in the value of invested
stock by 3.4 percentage points. 237 Professor Lynn Stout aptly stated that in
order to gain this trust:
“American investors must believe that somehow the legal system
constrains these individuals sufficiently that the benefits of
investing outweigh the risks. They must believe that the
regulators are regulating, and the watchdogs are watching. In
other words, investors may not need to trust people before they
are willing to give up their hard-earned dollars. But they must at
least trust the system.” 238
If investors believe that regulators are appropriately monitoring fraud,
conflicts of interest, and other financial abuses, then they would be more
willing to invest in various markets. 239 Limited investor confidence can
eventually constrain liquidity by pushing investors out of the capital
markets into safer investments, such as treasury bonds. This can lead to
decreased gains for existing stockholders, lower amounts of spending, other
major cutbacks by companies, and slower economic growth.
Even still, it is difficult to predict with certainty whether the removal
of the solicitation ban will lead to a significant increase in the speculative
activities described above. It is too early to determine whether there is a
significant correlation between advertising and speculation. Furthermore,
even if speculation does in fact increase within the broader capital markets,
it is equally difficult to measure the resulting harm, if any, to investor
confidence and capital production. Due to this uncertainty, the SEC and/or
Congress should mandate the completion of a study by the SEC’s Division
of Economic and Risk Analysis aimed at rigorously investigating the

236. Luigi Guiso, et al., Trusting the Stock Market, 63 J. FIN. 2557 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=811545.
237. Id. at 2558.
238. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game 21 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research
Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=322301.
239. Id.
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speculation that is created by the ever-growing hedge fund industry. Such
a study should be completed within two years after the final solicitation
rules are adopted by the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Although certain regulatory challenges remain, the removal of the
solicitation ban is a step in the right direction from the perspective of hedge
fund investors. As hedge funds continue to extend their reach into the
portfolios of institutional investors, such as pension plans, insurance
companies, and endowments, it is imperative that the industry becomes
more transparent and more competitive. Removing the solicitation ban will
move the industry closer to these goals, which will foster innovation,
promote optimal investment decisions, and give high-quality funds the
platform to effectively distinguish themselves from the pack. These
resulting characteristics will inevitably make it more difficult for fraudulent
advisers to induce prospective investors, as it will be more difficult for
them to operate in the shadows.
If regulators can also begin the process of resolving the latent
valuation challenges that still plague the industry, investors will have an
even greater incentive to optimize their various hedge fund investments.
Additionally, if the SEC can close the fraud loopholes presented by smaller
funds through requiring all advisers who utilize advertisements to register
under the Advisers Act, then investors will be further protected from
fraudulent investment schemes. As the hedge fund industry continues to
evolve, regulators, as well as Congress, must become more aggressive in
keeping up with the changing landscape of the industry. This will entail
further evaluation of increasing levels of speculation and the extent to
which this speculation can harm investor confidence.

MARTIN_FINAL (ARTICLE 4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1188

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Blank Page]

8/28/2014 2:43 PM

[Vol. 16.4

